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NAVIGATING THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS MAZE
IN THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX ARENA
JOSEPH S. MERRILL, PH.D., CPA
KATHERINE D. BLACK, J.D., LLM, CPA

I. INTRODUCTION
Individual taxpayers frequently realize that a tax return filed with the IRS
needs to be changed for various reasons that may include: previously estimated
amounts may later be discovered to have been in error, prior ignorance may have been
rectified, or new interpretations of law may have been rendered by the courts or the
IRS. The need to adjust a previously filed return may be discovered in the year of
filing, or several years later.
State and federal laws generally create statutes of limitation that let the parties
to litigation know when the deadlines for bringing the suit expire. Sometimes these
statutes are procedural or jurisdictional, such that the court has no jurisdiction to hear
the case if the limitations period has passed. At other times, the statute simply bars
the recovery. However, in tax law, it may be necessary to litigate the entire case
before it can be ascertained which statute of limitations applied. Once it is
determined, it may turn out that the statute was jurisdictional, thus, the court never
had jurisdiction to hear the case, or it may bar the recovery.
This article discusses the unusual maze that must be navigated by a taxpayer
desiring to file a claim for refund resulting from a change in a previously filed
return. The scope is limited to an individual and an unusual specific set of
facts. However, the general principles illustrate the problems that may be encountered
by practitioners and taxpayers in this otherwise seemingly straight forward area.
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF STATUTES OF LIMITATION
Federal law as well as all state laws provides statutes which require that
lawsuits be brought within a certain period of time. These statutes, limiting the period
of time in which one can bring a lawsuit, are referred to as "statutes of
limitations."[1] Thus, a lawsuit may not be brought unless the suit is brought within a
specified period of time after the right has accrued.[2] These statutes balance the
plaintiff's right to have a reasonable amount of time to prepare a case against fairness
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to the defendant. Their purpose is to reduce the unfairness of defending actions after a
substantial period of time has elapsed. Over time, memories fade and documents are
lost and thus, a defendant will have greater difficulty defending a lawsuit when it is
brought a long time after the event occurs. Further, the legal system seeks to avoid
the anxiety and disruption caused by prolonged fear of litigation. The event which
starts the running of the statute of limitations may vary. Sometimes this is the event
itself that is the subject of the suit or prosecution (such as a crime or personal injury),
but it may also be an event such as the discovery of a condition, such as discovering a
defect in a manufactured good. In tax law, however, even the event may be hard to
ascertain.
The fact that the statute of limitations has run does not necessarily mean that
the court is deprived of jurisdiction to hear a matter,[3] and a plaintiff is not
automatically barred from filing his or her claim because the statute of limitations has
expired.[4] The court could not adjudicate the question of the proper application of the
statute of limitations if it did not have subject matter jurisdiction.[5] This is especially
critical in tax matters which may require an adjudication of the facts at issue before a
determination as to which statute of limitations applies. However, the legislature may
impose a provision for a time constraint that may be a subject matter jurisdictional
requirement, if that is the apparent intent of the legislature.[6]
Statutes of limitation have aspects that are both procedural and substantive;
procedural in that they regulate when a party may file a lawsuit and substantive in that
they may affect the outcome.[7] Case law is mixed on whether the statute should be
considered procedural or substantive.[8] However, the fact that a court has found that
a time limit is procedural does not necessarily mean that the time limit is
jurisdictional.[9]
While a statute of limitations generally is procedural [10] and extinguishes the
remedy rather than the right, a statute of repose is substantive[11] and extinguishes both
the remedy and the actual action.[12] Compliance with a statute of repose is a
condition precedent to a party's right to maintain a lawsuit;[13] and when a time period
is a condition precedent to a plaintiff's right to seek a remedy, the time period is
jurisdictional.[14]
The determination of whether a statute is a conditional statute (barring the
right to bring the action) or a statute of limitations (not barring the hearing but perhaps
barring the recovery), turns on the statutory language used.[15] The language creating
the statute must indicate clearly that a failure to comply with its terms bars the claim,
and that filing by the prescribed time is a condition to the existence of the claim, or
that failure to file deprives the court of jurisdiction.[16] The fact that the limitation is in
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the statute that creates the cause of action is persuasive evidence that it is intended as
a condition of the right created. However, this is not conclusive.[17] A time limitation
is, generally, deemed a condition precedent if it is fixed in the statute, whereas a
general time limitation must be pleaded as an affirmative defense if the cause of
action comes about as a result of common law or by virtue of another statute.[18]
Because a statute of limitations must be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and
is waived if it is not pleaded, a statute of limitation generally is not
jurisdictional [19] unless it is a limitations period for claims against the
government.[20] The federal statute that imposes a limitation on actions in the Court of
Federal Claims[21] is jurisdictional.[22] However, the six-year statute of limitations for
civil actions commenced against the United States[23] is not jurisdictional, given that
the statute makes no mention of jurisdiction, but only creates a procedural bar.[24] The
receipt of a notice of deficiency[25] and the bringing of an action in the tax court within
90 days is jurisdictional, as is the 12 month filing requirement under § 6411.[26]
Most jurisdictions provide that limitations are tolled under certain
circumstances. Tolling will prevent the time for filing suit from running while the
condition exists. In general, the law recognizes two types of special circumstances
which would make the operation of the statute of limitations unfair. The first is where
the plaintiff may be under a disability making it difficult for the plaintiff to bring an
action within the required time period (e.g. the plaintiff may be too young, disabled,
or imprisoned). In these circumstances, many statutes provide an additional period of
time (e.g. one year after the plaintiff becomes an adult, is judged competent, or is
released from prison). The second special circumstance is where the plaintiff is
unaware of the cause of action and the operation of the statute without some exception
would impose an unfair hardship. For example, some types of fraud may not be
discovered for some time, defaults in title may not be discovered until the party tries
to sell the property, or in medical malpractice cases an injury may not be discovered
for years. In these situations, the time periods provided in the statute of limitations
may begin to run when the injury is discovered, not when it happens.
Such is not the case in claim of right situations in taxation. Instead, a special
code section provides a separate remedy with its own jurisdictional statute of
limitations and leaves the general statute of limitations in place to run even though the
event has not been discovered.
The length of the statutes of limitations varies from country to country and
state to state even for the same types of actions. The length of the statutes of
limitations are unique to tax law itself. The length of time often depends on the type
of action or the seriousness of the act. For example, some crimes such as murder are
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so horrific to society that they have no statute of limitations. Presumably, failure to
file a tax return and filing a fraudulent tax return rise to the same horrific category, as
they too have no statute of limitations.
In tax law, as in state and federal civil and criminal actions, the statute of
limitations acts to provide a date of finality after which neither the IRS nor the
taxpayer may bring a lawsuit in regard to a previously filed tax return or to a tax
transaction. In most civil or criminal actions, the nature of the action is known in
advance (e.g. a crime of murder, a contract action, fraud, etc.) Thus, the parties are
aware of the date for computation of the statute of limitations. The only point of issue
may arise in those causes of action that start the statute when the plaintiff becomes
aware that the injury has occurred. In those situations, the parties may argue about
exactly when the plaintiff became aware. However, unlike most other civil and
criminal actions, the time of the statute of limitations for tax actions may depend upon
the ultimate findings in the lawsuit relating to underlying tax issues (e.g. is the item
income, was it undervalued, etc.) Thus, the parties may not even know which statute
of limitations they are under until the lawsuit is finished. It is possible, therefore, for
the parties to have completed the litigation, and only upon the finding of the facts,
discover that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations.
From the Government's perspective, statutes of limitation restrict the
taxpayer's right to claim a refund of overpaid tax or initiate litigation to obtain a
refund. From the taxpayer's perspective, statutes of limitation prevent the IRS from
undertaking an audit, collecting a deficiency in tax or beginning a civil or criminal
case.
III. THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Under I.R.C.§ 6501(a), the IRS must first assess the amount of tax before it
can take action to collect it. Assessment occurs when an authorized IRS employee
signs Form 23-C. The IRS cannot assess a tax after the statute of limitations on
assessment has expired even if the taxpayer agrees to the assessment.[27] Under IRC §
6501(a) and Reg. § 301.6501(a)-1(a), the IRS is required to assess tax within 3 years
after the tax return was filed with the IRS.
The IRS has up to three years from the due date of a tax return, or the date of
filing, whichever is later, to assess all income taxes due (“three-year rule”). A tax
return filed prior to the due date is treated as if filed on the due date. The statute of
limitation on assessment begins to run on the day after the taxpayer files the
return.[28] Thus, the day of filing is excluded from the computation of the three-year
period. A timely mailed return is treated as filed on the due date of the return even if
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it is received by the IRS after the due date.[29] Amended returns do not extend the
original 3-year period.[30]
The three-year rule can be extended by agreement of the parties.[31] Parties to
an audit will frequently agree to an extension to keep the IRS from assessing in order
to meet the statute of limitations. Any such agreement must be in writing and must be
signed by the taxpayer and the IRS before the expiration of the original three-year
rule.
The three-year rule may also be suspended after a timely issuance of a proper
and valid notice of deficiency.[32] This may occur upon the following:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Application by the taxpayer for a Taxpayer Assistance Order[33];
Filing of a Bankruptcy petition.[34];
Application for a Receivership[35];
Issuance of a Summons by the IRS to a third-party[36];
Issuance of a designated summons by the IRS to a corporate
taxpayer.[37]
IV. RETURN PREPARED BY AN IRS OFFICIAL

A return prepared by an IRS official or employee in the situation of a taxpayer
who has not filed a return will not start the statute of limitations.[38] If an IRS agent or
employee prepares a return for a taxpayer who did not file a return and assesses tax on
that return and then later discovers that he prepared the return incorrectly, the IRS has
no restrictions on the amount of time that they can come back and reassess additional
tax. A taxpayer for whom a substitute return was prepared can, however, start the
running of the three-year statute of limitations on assessment by filing a correct return.
1. ASSESSMENT OF PENALTIES
As a general rule, the IRS must assess tax, or file suit against the taxpayer to
collect the tax, within three years after the return is filed.[39] The three-year period of
limitation on assessment also applies to penalties. Under IRC § 6665(a), additions to
tax, additional amounts, and penalties (IRC §§ 6651-6724) are assessed and collected
in the same manner as tax. Furthermore, any reference in the Code to "tax" includes
such additions and penalties.
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2. WHEN IS A RETURN "FILED"
The timely mailing of a return is treated as timely filing.[40] Thus, even though
the IRS receives the return after the due date, the return will be considered timely if it
was mailed to the IRS by the due date. The date of the postmark stamped on the
envelope by the U.S. Postal Service determines the date it was mailed. However, if
the IRS does not receive it or loses it, the taxpayer must prove that it was sent. Hence
the recommendation that all returns be filed by certified mail with a “return receipt
requested”. If the return is sent by registered or certified mail, the registration mark
provides prima facie evidence that the form or document in the envelope was actually
delivered to the IRS. Tax information sent through a private delivery service such as
Federal Express or UPS qualifies under the timely mailed/timely filed rule.[41] A
registration date or the date stamped on the sender's receipt is treated as the postmark
date when sent by a private delivery service.[42] The statute of limitations does not
begin to run if the taxpayer files a return with the wrong Service Center.[43]
3. WHAT CONSTITUTES A "RETURN”?
A person required to file a return must do so "according to the forms and
regulations prescribed by the Secretary"[44]. The person must sign the return [45] and
the return must contain a written declaration made under penalty of perjury.[46] The
Supreme Court has identified the basic elements of a return that start the running of
the statute of limitations on assessment.[47] Those elements are:
A.
the taxpayer must purport to file a return,
B.
sworn to as such,
C.
that shows an honest and genuine attempt to satisfy the law. It is not
required that the return be perfectly accurate. The Internal Revenue
Manual adds additional requirements:[48] the taxpayer must provide
sufficient information to enable the IRS to ascertain and assess the
taxpayer's tax liability. This requires that 1) the amount of income be
disclosed, and 2) that the nature of the income must be disclosed (e.g.
earned income, passive income, investment income, etc.).
4. SIX-YEAR EXCEPTION TO THREE-YEAR RULE, IRC § 6501(E)
A six-year statute of limitations on assessment applies to returns that omit a
substantial amount of gross income.[49] The statute of limitations is extended to six
years when the taxpayer omits gross income in an amount exceeding 25% of gross
income actually reported on the income tax return. The extended statute gives the IRS
extra time to identify and assess a deficiency in situations where the taxpayer's return
gives no clue as to the existence of the omitted income.[50]
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The limitations period is extended with respect to the taxpayer's entire tax
return for the year, not just the specific omitted items of income.[51] An item of
income is not considered omitted from a return if the return or an attached schedule
contains adequate information to apprise the District Director of the nature and
amount of such item.[52] Taxpayer’s must include enough information to allow the
IRS to “audit” the return on its face. Adequate disclosure may include information
from a combination of documents attached to the taxpayer's return, or in some cases, a
combination of information from the return and information from another return such
as a partnership or S corporation return in which the taxpayer is a partner or
shareholder.[53] The filing of a correct amended return does not shorten the six-year
rule if the extended statute applied to the original return.[54]
IRC § 6501(e) applies only to innocent or negligent omissions of gross
income. Therefore, a six-year limitation period does not apply to fraudulent omissions
of gross income, which instead can be assessed at any time.
V. NO STATUTE OF LIMITATION
There is no statute of limitations on the amount of time the IRS has to audit
and assess additional tax if any of the following apply:[55]
A.
B.
C.

The taxpayer does not file a return[56]:
A false or fraudulent return is filed with the intent to evade tax.[57] The
IRS has the burden of proving this for each year it assesses tax under the
unlimited limitations period of IRC § 6501(c)(1)[58];
The taxpayer attempts to defeat or evade any tax, other than income,
estate, and gift tax.[59]

The three-year rule does not apply to the assessment of taxes, interest and
penalties attributable to a false or fraudulent return.[60] In Badaracco, the Supreme
Court held that the filing of a nonfraudulent amended return after filing a false or
fraudulent return does not start the running of the statute of limitations on
assessment.[61] On the other hand, a correct return filed after a taxpayer has failed to
file a return starts the running of the three-year statute of limitations on assessment.
1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR COLLECTION OF TAX FROM
TAXPAYER
The assessment of a tax imposes a lien on all of the taxpayer's tangible and
intangible real and personal property.[62] The IRS has ten years from the assessment
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date to either collect the tax by administrative means (seizures, levies, offsets) or
institute a suit for collection or a judgment.[63] If the IRS commences a timely suit to
collect tax or to obtain a judgment, then it may continue its efforts to collect the tax
even if it extends beyond the ten-year period.[64]
The following actions will act to extend the statute of limitations for
collection:
A.
B.
C.

The taxpayer signs a waiver of the statute of limitations. The 10-year
IRS limitation can be extended by agreement provided the agreement is
made prior to the expiration of the ten-year period.[65]
The taxpayer leaves the United States for more than six months.[66]
A bankruptcy by the taxpayer will extend the statute of limitations on
nondischargeable taxes for the pendency of the bankruptcy plus six
months (generally courts have held that the pendency of the bankruptcy
is from the filing of a petition to date of discharge).[67]

2. LIMITATIONS ON TAXPAYER’S RIGHT TO CLAIM A REFUND
A taxpayer may file a claim for a refund of an overpayment of any tax within
three years from the time the return was filed or two years from the time the tax was
paid, whichever period is later. If no return was filed, the claim may be made within
two years from the date that the tax was paid.[68]
A taxpayer may file a claim within seven years if the refund pertains to a bad
debt under § 166 or § 832(c) or in connection with a loss from a worthless security
under § 165(g).[69]
VI. CASE ANALYSIS
The rules relating to the statute of limitations seem to be at least navigable if
not straight forward until you get into the actual application stage. Politicians, tax
practitioners, and taxpayers all seem to agree with a remark by Albert Einstein, “The
hardest thing in the world to understand is the income tax.”
Under the general rule, a taxpayer has a three-year statute of limitations in
which to file an amended return. However, a taxpayer desiring to claim a tax refund
from prior years may be required to wander through a maze of IRC sections, court
cases, and IRS publications in order to ascertain if this is possible under the statute of
limitations.
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1. FACTS:
In early 1993, Taxpayer was forced to leave the workplace (a federal agency)
allegedly due to misconduct on the part of her supervisor which caused and/or
exacerbated a physical condition, resulted in psychological trauma, and rendered her
totally disabled to perform work in her vocation. Thereafter, Taxpayer filed an
internal complaint against her supervisor (as required by law before proceeding with
further legal action). Taxpayer timely filed claims alleging sex discrimination, failure
to accommodate a known disability, retaliation, and intentional infliction of mental
distress under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
Taxpayer’s Washington superiors instructed her to file for disability retirement
under the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), which operates under the
Federal Office of Personnel Management. Taxpayer eventually received taxable
benefits under FERS equivalent to approximately 40 percent of the average of her
three highest pay years.
Taxpayer’s superiors knew of her allegations regarding the supervisor’s
misconduct (and the injuries resulting therefrom) during the time period for filing a
claim for federal workers compensation benefits (a period which ended just a few
months after Taxpayer left the workplace). However, no one at the federal agency
advised Taxpayer of her right to file for federal Workers’ Compensation benefits with
the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).
Shortly before the 1999 trial of Taxpayer’s various causes of action, the judge
ordered Taxpayer to file with OWCP to determine whether or not she had a valid
claim for benefits. A finding by OWCP that Taxpayer’s injuries were work related,
and thus compensable, would bar her FTCA cause of action. Thus, the FTCA portion
of the case was severed and the remaining claims went to trial.
In May of 2000, OWCP determined that Taxpayer had suffered injuries in the
workplace and was eligible for benefits (which would retroactively begin for 1993 and
continue throughout the disability). Taxpayer was eligible for benefits even though
her OWCP claim was filed approximately seven years beyond the regulatory
deadline. Taxpayer had submitted evidence to OWCP that verified that not only had
her employer been aware of her allegations of workplace injuries during the original
1993 OWCP filing period but that she had also been directed specifically to file for
FERS benefits without OWCP. OWCP benefits provide 75 percent of the injured
worker’s pay if claimant has dependents and 66 percent if no dependents, and in
addition, cover all medical costs related to the workplace injuries.
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OWCP calculated back and front pay. As part of this process, OWCP was
required to reimburse FERS for the benefits they provided Taxpayer from 1993
through the present and were required to pay Taxpayer the difference in the
retroactive benefit differential. In addition, OWCP reimbursed her for medical
expenses previously paid and deducted.
2. THE GENERAL ISSUE
At first glance, Taxpayer’s situation appears to be fairly simple. She reported
and paid taxes on an amount which she received and to which she thought she had a
right. Later it was determined that she had to repay the previously reported income
and, in lieu thereof, received a greater amount of non-taxable income. In principle, it
would seem that all she had to do was file amended returns reducing her taxable
income by the amounts to which she was not entitled (and consequently had to repay)
and claim refunds of taxes paid which did not have to be paid. It would seem that
fairness would dictate the above simple remedy.
3. TAX ISSUES RELATED TO THE FACTS
Obviously, the facts suggest both legal and income tax issues. The legal issues
raised and resolved in court will not be discussed. The tax issues presented are:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

In general, may Taxpayer get a refund for prior years taxes which
were based upon taxable retirement income, which were later
reclassified as Workers’ Compensation?
When, and upon what basis, may she file for a refund? That is,
can she file on the basis of a letter of determination from the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP), or must
she wait until the actual receipt of money from OWCP, net of the
amount repaid to the Federal Employees Retirement System
(FERS)?
When she does file, must (can) she amends each prior return filed
or can she do it in a lump-sum (with supporting calculations)?
Are (or will) her Workers’ Compensation payments really be nontaxable?
May she claim a deduction for the amount OWCP reimburses to
FERS in her behalf?
Does she qualify for the net operating loss provisions?
How does she handle the reimbursement for medical expenses
paid that she previously deducted as itemized deductions?
Are some prior years closed to her as to refund claims?
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9.
10.

Does the fact that the delay in properly classifying the payments
as Workers’ Compensation was caused by a federal agency affect
Taxpayer’s filing status or statute of limitations?
Is there a best choice among various options under which she may
choose to file?

4. REFUNDS IN GENERAL
IRC § 6402(a) grants authority to the Secretary to make refunds, or payments
of any tax within the applicable period of limitations after netting the refund against
any liability owed by the taxpayer for any internal revenue taxes. Paragraphs (b) and
(c) expand the netting to allow credits against estimated taxes and past-due support
payments owed because of the Social Security Act (§ 464). I.R.C. § 6402 (a) clarifies
the term “overpayment” as being “. . . the amount of the payment of any internal
revenue tax which is assessed or collected after the expiration of the period of
limitation properly applicable thereto.”
While the above code section allows the possibility of a refund to a taxpayer,
there are several obstacles and hurdles which one faces in order to actually get a check
in the mail. I.R.C. § 6402(a) does not give the taxpayer blanket permission to file
refund claims for all past overpayments, in that it specifically states that the
Secretary’s authority to grant refunds is subject to, “. . . the applicable period of
limitations. . .” The restriction allows a variety of limitation periods.
The general rule which governs the years for which refund claims may be filed
is found in I.R.C. § 6511(a), which states:
Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this
title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall
be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed
or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods
expires the later.
Furthermore I.R.C. § 6511(b) reinforces paragraph (a) by stating, “No. . .
refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limitation
prescribed in subsection (a). . .” As absolute as the rule appears, one may be justified
in following the adage, “There’s an exception to every rule.” Several of the
exceptions to the absolute rule are found in I.R.C. § 6511(c) and (d). Subsection
(d)(2) concerning net operating losses, may apply to Taxpayer. Another major
exception to the 3-year rule can be found in § 1314(d) which allows adjustments and
refunds back to 1932. While it seems that Taxpayer can in general file refund claims
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only for the prior three years, it is also possible that various exceptions to the general
rule may allow her to go back to earlier years. Several court cases relating to the issue
of extending the open years will be discussed later.
5. TAXABILITY OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Taxpayer received the Worker’s Compensation money, spent it, and
designated it as disability income. Disability income is taxable under §104. The
income did not result from personal injuries or sickness from active service in the
armed forces covered by §104(a)(4) and so could not be excluded under that
section. She could have claimed that notwithstanding her non-military employment
she was entitled to exclude the disability payments because §104(a)(2) excludes from
gross income damages received on account of personal injury or sickness. The 1996
revision of the section restricted the exclusion to apply only to, “personal physical
injuries or physical sickness”.
In Taxpayer’s case her employer caused her to suffer emotional injury. At
issue then is whether the physical and emotional sickness qualifies her income to be
excluded under §104(a)(2). The House Ways and Means Committee provided the
following guidance on the matter: “If any action has its origin in a physical injury or
sickness, then all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom are
treated as payments received on account of physical injury . . .”
However, the statute specifies that “emotional distress” is not a physical
injury. Additionally, the 1996 amendments bar the exclusion for damages based on
claims of employment discrimination or injury to reputation, even if the suit includes
“a claim of emotional distress”.[70] However, §104(a)(1) clearly states that “. . . gross
income does not include. . . amounts received under Workers’ Compensation acts as
compensation for personal injuries or sickness;” “personal injuries” under Workers’
Compensation is broad enough to include emotional distress. Thus, the physical
injury or sickness criteria under § 104(a)(2) is not applicable. Since Taxpayer’s
Workers’ Compensation falls clearly under § 104(a)(1) as compensation for personal
injuries she is entitled to exclude all “reclassification” payments since they are
amounts received as compensation under Workers’ Compensation. Future Workers’
Compensation payments will also be excludable.
6. DEDUCTIBILITY OF REIMBURSEMENT TO FERS
At first glance, the general three-year statute of limitations should bar
Taxpayer from filing amended returns for pre-1999 years. However, at the time of the
receipts, the amounts were not categorized under Workers’ Compensation. Only after
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the trial were the amounts ordered changed to Workers’ Compensation and the
retirement benefits reimbursed. Therefore, what is the statute of limitations for
amounts which are recharacterized after the initial statute of limitations has run? Is it
possible for her to file amended returns for refunds for the years prior to 1999 even
though the retirement payments were received and included in those years? That is, at
the time, the receipts were properly characterized as taxable retirement benefits and
not as excludible benefits under a Workers’ Compensation act. Presumably, the retroactive payment for Workers’ Compensation which were received in full in 2002 could
be excluded. However, in 2002 she also received some disability retirement pay
reimbursements for medical expenses and in the same year had to re-pay all prior
disability pay. Thus, without a tax refund, her Workers’ Compensation will have been
subject to tax.
In general, the doctrine of equitable recoupment allows taxpayers to recoup
overpayments, and the IRS to recoup deficiencies, that have been barred by the statute
of limitations. However, the doctrine applies only to narrowly defined situations
which require the offset of overpayments and deficiencies, or vice versa. In addition,
the time-barred offset must, “arise out of the same transaction, term or taxable event
as the overpayment or deficiency”.[71]
7. DEIMBURSEMENT OF PRIOR DEDUCTION
Another set of provisions which may reduce Taxpayer’s refund claim stems
from the “tax benefit rule”. This rule is found in I.R.C.§ 111. An excellent history of
the law behind Section 111 may be found in Bittker and Lokken’s Federal Taxation of
Income, Estates, and Gifts, Second/Third Edition. As Bittker and Lokken explain, the
principle was first developed by the courts and narrowly applied, but later (1984)
incorporated by statute in a broad manner.
The tax benefit rules of I.R.C. § 111 generally state that if a deduction taken
by a taxpayer which reduced the taxable income in year one is recovered in a later
year (e.g. year two) then the amount of the recovery shall be included as income in
year two. The tax benefit rule evidently maintains the purity of tax years as to what
actually happened and reduces the administrative burden which would be created by
amended returns, refunds and/or interest payments. The rule is applicable to Taxpayer
since during the years in question, she took deductions for medical and legal expenses
some of which were reimbursed to her from OWCP.
Taxpayer’s tax benefit from the reimbursement of medical expenses is limited
because at the time the deductions were taken, they were limited to the excess of the
medical expenses over 7.5% of her adjusted gross income (AGI). For example, if
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AGI were $40,000 and total medical expenses were $3,500, she was only able to
deduct $500 ($3,500 - 3,000(.075 x 40,000)). So, while she was reimbursed $3,500,
only $500 produced a tax benefit within the tax benefit rule and must be reported as
income. When the tax benefit rule is applied to an individual who did not deduct
medical expense as an itemized deduction, none of the recovery is income. Or, in the
event that the allowed medical deduction created total itemized deductions that exceed
the standard deduction by $800, then only $800 would be subject to taxation.
The fact that some unfairness may result due to the recovery year placing the
taxpayer in a higher marginal tax rate than the rate when the deduction took place is of
no consequence. The IRS looks at dollars as “taxed dollars or previously taxed
dollars”. Thus, all dollars are the same regardless of the rate of tax imposed. As
Bittker and Lokkin explain:
. . . (T)he courts have been satisfied with the rough-and-ready adjustment that
results from taxing the recovery at whatever rate prevails in the year of
recovery, and have not insisted on exacting a tax equal to the amount saved by
the taxpayer in the earlier year.[72]
In Taxpayer’s case the above works in her favor, in that in the recovery year
she paid no tax due to the I.R.C. § 1341 provisions. However, one must be careful in
computing the includable recovery due to changes in the percentage of non-deductible
medical expenses resulting from changes in the percent of AGI factor. The specific
instructions for tax benefit receipts are found in IRS Publication 525.
8. EXTENDING THE REFUND YEARS
I.R.C. §§ 1311-14 deal with correction of errors which have occurred since
1932.[73] Are the rules applicable to Taxpayer? The general rule of the sections states
that if the correction is, “. . . prevented by the operation of any law. . . other than this
part. . . then the effect of the error shall be corrected by . . . section 1314.” As shown
earlier, this deals only with specific situations, none of which apply to Taxpayer.
9. CLAIMS FOR REFUND AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS
RUN
I.R.C. § 6511(a)(1) clearly states that a claim for credit or refund of an
overpayment shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was
filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid. The Supreme Court in the 1996 case
of United States v. Mariann Brockamp [74] reversed the Ninth Circuit and stated that
the limitations set forth in I.R.C. § 6511 cannot be tolled for non-statutory equitable
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reasons. The court said, “Section 6511 sets forth its time limitations in a highly
detailed technical manner, reiterates them several times in different ways, imposes
substantive limitations, and sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic time limits that
do not include ‘equitable tolling’. . . There are no counterindications of congressional
intent.”
Revenue Rule 78-161 arose from the 1976, 4th Circuit case
of Strickland v. Commissioner[75]. In this case, the taxpayer retired from the U.S.
Army and received retirement pay based on years of service. Later, the Veterans’
Administration awarded disability pay retroactively. The years of service pay was
reduced by the disability pay. The prior rule on such awards, Revenue Ruling 62-14,
was revoked by Revenue Ruling 78-161 which ruled, “the Internal Revenues Service
will follow the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Strickland as precedent in the disposition of similar cases involving section 104(a)(4)
of the Code.”
While Strickland allows retroactive adjustments of tax due to reclassification
of taxable retirement income to non-taxable disability income, it applies only to I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(4) disability pay connected with active duty in the armed forces. It also
requires that the refund be sought within the limitations period.
Moreover, Revenue Rule 78-161 was discussed in the Sullivan case (discussed
below). The Court noted that, “veterans may rely upon a retroactive award of the VA,
for an adjustment in their tax liability.” The Strickland case, however, does not reach
or address the question of how far back such adjustments may be made or how to
adjust taxable income in the case of an expired statute of limitations under 26
U.S.C.A. § 6511.
Thus, Taxpayer can get no help from Revenue Ruling 78-161 because her
federal employment was not with the military and moreover it gives no guidance as to
the mechanics of filing her refund claim and fails to provide an exception to the threeyear statute of limitations for filing a refund claim. She must look elsewhere for a
remedy.
Two relevant court cases which do apply to Taxpayer are Joosten and
Sullivan. The case of Joosten v. United States[76] is relevant to Taxpayer for several
reasons. Briefly, the facts are as follows: Plaintiff’s husband, a veteran, died in 1982
and soon thereafter she began receiving survivor benefits from the Army Finance
Center (AFC). These benefits continued until 1991 and Plaintiff filed timely tax
returns and claimed the benefits as income. In July 1991, the Veteran’s
Administration determined that the husband had in fact been entitled to Disability
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Indemnity Compensation (DIC) under the Agent Orange Act of 1991. Consequently,
the VA reimbursed the AFC for the survivor benefits and paid the Plaintiff DIC
benefits which are not taxable. In May of 1993, Plaintiff filed a refund claim for taxes
paid on the AFC payments from 1989-1991. The IRS refunded the taxes with
interest. In 1994, Plaintiff again filed for a refund for the taxes paid on the AFC
benefits for the years 1983-1988. The later refund claim was the issue before the New
Jersey District Court.
As to the closed years (1992-1997) being re-opened, the Joosten court rejected
the request, based upon the Supreme Court’s reasoning from Dalm, 494 U.S. at 602 “.
. . the import of these sections [7422 and 6511] is clear: unless a claim for refund of a
tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by sec. 6511 (a), a suit for refund,
regardless of whether the tax is alleged to have been ‘erroneously’, ‘illegally’, or
‘wrongfully collected’ (sec. 1346 (a) (1), 7422 (a), may not be maintained in any
court.”[77]
After consideration of the statutory framework governing refund claims, in
particular the interplay between I.R.C. §§ 6511(a) and 7422, the Supreme Court held
that:
tax refund claims may not be premised on an equitable theory in defiance of the
statutory bars to recovery. Id. at 601-02. Indeed, the failure to file a timely
claim is unequivocally described as an absolute bar:[T]he import of these
sections is clear: unless a claim for refund of a tax has been filed within the
time limits imposed by §6511(a) , a suit for refund, regardless of whether the
tax is alleged to have been "erroneously," "illegally," or "wrongfully collected,"
§§1346(a)(1), 7422(a) , may not be maintained in any court.[78]
Thus, Dalm represents the Supreme Court's rejection of equitable modification
of the filing limits on refund claim statutes set by I.R.C. § 6511(a).
The Joosten Court further stated, “Plaintiff attempts to circumvent the bar of
the statute of limitations set forth in Section 6511 (a) by arguing that she is entitled to
equitable relief. The use of equitable principles to mitigate a taxpayer’s failure to
submit a timely refund claim was explicitly considered and rejected by the Supreme
Court in Dalm.” The court continued, “The Third Circuit, in the Kreiger decision,
recognized the importance of the government’s interest in the efficient collection . .
. noting that equitable tolling of the tax refund limitations would be an otherwise
unreasonable burden upon orderly administrative function.”[79]
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The reasoning and conclusions are clear. The three-year limit for refunds
imposed by §6511 is cast in concrete. Taxpayer may not open closed years. The
interesting fact of the case that concerns Taxpayer concerns the first refund claim
made and paid by the IRS. The question is, why did Mrs. Joosten get a refund for the
open years of 1989-1991? Was not her situation one that falls under IRC §1341
Claim of Right? On what basis could she claim the refund when it was evidently
based solely on a re-classification of prior taxable income (AFC) to non-taxable (DIC)
benefits after the AFC payments had been reimbursed by the DIC? Because Taxpayer
so closely parallels the facts of Joosten, may she not also file for a refund, plus
interest, for the taxes paid on disability retirement income after it was reclassified as
tax exempt Workers’ Compensation? The relevance of the Joosten case only covers
Taxpayer’s open years because the court ruled that the closed years (beyond the §
6511 three-year limitation) may not be re-opened. Joosten dealt only with the closed
year issue and the details of the first refund are only mentioned and specifics not
discussed.
The case of John G. and Collen A. Sullivan[80] is similar in some respects
to Joosten, previously discussed. In Sullivan, the taxpayers had numerous
adjustments to Mr. Sullivan’s military disability rating and used the higher rating to
file their returns and thereby reduce taxes. Their returns were based upon Rev. Rul.
78-161. The novel aspect of their case was that Plaintiffs argued that their claim did
not constitute a claim for overpaid taxes but a categorization as, a “recommendation
for monetary benefit.” (p.1) Thus they took their case to the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims. The facts state that the IRS allowed a refund (plus interest) of $18,660.20 for
the years 1993-1995 and disallowed in total claims for 1988-1992. In part the IRS
said, “Revenue Ruling 78-161 applies to only those years not closed by the statutes of
limitations.”
The bulk of the case dealt with the issue of whether or not the Court of Federal
Claims had jurisdiction and, if so, could it waive the § 6511(a) limitations. The
doctrine of equitable estoppel was discussed in detail and U.S. v. Brockamp was
quoted as follows, “Congress did not intend the ‘equitable tolling’ doctrine to apply to
section 6511's time limitations. . . In addition, Sec 6511 sets forth explicit exceptions
to its basic time limits, and those very specific exceptions do not include equitable
tolling.”[81]
The court went on to observe that, “The nature and potential magnitude of the
administrative problem suggests that congress decided to pay the price of occasional
unfairness in individual cases (penalizing a taxpayer whose claim is unavoidably
delayed in order to maintain a more workable tax enforcement system.”[82]
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As to Strickland the court noted that the case stood for the “. . . general
proposition that disability awards are not taxable as gross income and that, in
appropriate circumstances, veterans may rely upon a retroactive award of the VA, for
an adjustment in their tax liability.” The Strickland case, however, does not reach or
address the question of “how far back such adjustments may be made or how to adjust
taxable income in the case of an expired statute of limitations under 26 U.S.C.A. sec.
6511.”[83]
The Joosten court emphasized that, “unlike the federal statutes that have been
found subject to equitable tolling, the tax laws do not have a broad remedial purpose,
nor are they drafted to be especially protective of plaintiffs. To the contrary, the tax
laws are designed to accomplish the efficient and even-handed collection of revenue
from over 200 million taxpayers. . .”[84]
While the referenced cases of Joosten, Strickland and Sullivan (dealing with
military disability situations) are dissimilar to Taxpayer’s, they are relevant to her
case in several respects. The cases re-affirm that Taxpayer cannot amend or in any
way adjust the taxes for years barred by § 6511(a). On a positive
note Joosten and Sullivan were both allowed to amend returns for the years still open
by § 6511(a) even though their refund claims involved nothing more than having the
prior year’s income re-classified as non-taxable income.
10. RELIEF UNDER §§ 1341 AND 6411
Fortunately, Taxpayer is not required to claim a refund under I.R.C. § 6511
and in fact the three-year statute would prevent her from doing so. I.R.C. §
6411, provides that Taxpayer may file a “Tentative claim for Refund” which is not
actually a claim for refund, within twelve months of having to payback amounts
previously included under a claim of right. Since this is a “Tentative claim” and gives
the Taxpayer no rights to appeal or to the courts, there is no reason for the statute of
limitations to apply. It simply provides an opportunity for Taxpayer to calculate the
tax in the current year by calculating the tax in the previous years and provides for a
reduction of tax for the reduction that would have occurred in the previous year or in
the alternative, Taxpayer may simply take a deduction in the current year for the
amounts repaid. However, nothing in the process allows for an extension of the
statute of limitations.
In short, fairness would seem to be in Taxpayer’s favor regarding the filing of
a claim for refund under the traditional amended return, request for refund, and
appeals process, however congress has said otherwise and has provided an
alternative. Note, however, that whether or not to grant the refund under the
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“Tentative Request” of I.R.C. § 6411 is completely under the discretion of the IRS
with no appeals procedure available to the Taxpayer. As the court noted in Brockamp,
“Tax law, after all is not normally characterized by case-specific exceptions reflecting
individualized equities.”[85] Only a § 6411 claim can attempt to give Taxpayer some
relief for the taxes paid in the closed years.
11. CLAIM OF RIGHT
In order for Taxpayer to be subject to the relief provisions, she must
demonstrate that her situation falls under the provisions of I.R.C. § 1341, which deals
with the claim of right doctrine. § 1341 provides as follows:
Sec. 1341 COMPUTATION OF TAX WHERE TAXPAYER RESTORES
SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT HELD UNDER CLAIM OF
RIGHT1341(a) Sec. 1341 [1986 Code]. GENERAL RULE. --If-1341(a)(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or
years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such
item;
1341(a)(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was
established after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer
did not have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such item; and
1341(a)(3) the amount of such deduction exceeds $3,000, then the tax imposed
by this chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of the following:
1341(a)(4) the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction; or
1341(a)(5) an amount equal to-1341(a)(5)(A) the tax for the taxable year computed without such deduction,
minus
1341(a)(5)(B) the decrease in tax under this chapter (or the corresponding
provisions of prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year (or years) which
would result solely from the exclusion of such item (or portion thereof) from
gross income for such prior taxable year (or years).
Taxpayer included the retirement income as taxable income because it
appeared at the time that she had an unrestricted right to the income. It was only in
later years that it was established that the income should have been Workers’
Compensation income and that the retirement income had to be repaid. This clearly
falls under the provision of § 1341 and is supported by the above-mentioned case
law. Under the case law, Taxpayer would be allowed to file claims for refund under §
6511 for only the years that were still open but would be barred for claiming a refund
for closed years.
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I.R.C. § 6411(d)(1) provides a form of modification of the general statutes of
limitations in order to apply the provisions of § 1341. Reg.§5.6411-1 provides that a
taxpayer may file for a tentative refund which is not a claim for refund or
credit. Since it is not a claim for refund or credit it does not come under the general
statute of limitations. The regulation provides as follows:
Reg.§ 5.6411-1 Tentative refund under claim of right adjustment (Temporary).
-(b) In general. Section 6411(d) allows taxpayers to apply for a tentative refund
of amounts treated under section 1341(b)(1) as an overpayment of tax under a
claim of right adjustment. . .
(2) Computation under section 1341(a)(4). The application must contain the
following information related to the computation under section 1341(a)(4):
(i) The amount of income restored by the taxpayer to another during the taxable
year and the amount of the corresponding deduction described in section
1341(a)(2);
(ii) The tax for the taxable year computed with the deduction described in
section 1341(a)(2); and
(iii) The tax for each prior taxable year (determined before adjustment under
section 1341) to which any net operating loss described in section
1341(b)(4)(A) may be carried and the decrease in tax for each of those years
that results from the carryback of that loss.
(3) Computation under section 1341(a)(5). The application must contain the
following information related to the computation under section 1341(a)(5):
(i) The tax for the taxable year without the deduction described in section
1341(a)(2);
(ii) The tax for each prior taxable year (determined before adjustment under
section 1341) for which a decrease in tax is computed under section
1341(a)(5)(B);
(iii) The decrease in tax for each prior taxable year computed under section
1341(a)(5)(B), including any decrease resulting from a net operating loss or
capital loss described in section 1341(b)(4)(B); and
(iv) The amount treated as an overpayment of tax under section 1341(b)(1).
(e) Time and place for filing. The application must be filed no earlier than the
date of filing the return for the taxable year of restoration and no later than the
date 12 months from the last day of that taxable year. . .
(f) Not a claim for credit or refund. An application for tentative refund under
section 6411(d) is not a claim for credit or refund. The principles of paragraph
(b)(2) of § 1.6411-1 apply in determining the effect of an application for a
tentative refund. For example, the filing of an application for tentative refund
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under section 6411(d) is not a claim for credit or refund in determining whether
a claim for credit or refund was timely filed.
Payments received under a claim of right are correctly includable in income in
the year they are received even though it may be discovered in a later year that they
must be repaid. Thus, the inclusion of the FERS payments was correct. However, the
Taxpayer is allowed to deduct the repayments of the FERS amounts paid in the year
in which they are repaid. Taxpayer may take a deduction for the amounts paid in the
year paid. However, taking a deduction in a year in which all the income is found to
be non-taxable does not adequately compensate the Taxpayer for the tax paid in the
earlier years.
I.R.C. § 1341 alleviates the inequity caused by the timing differences if the
amount repaid exceeds $3,000. Taxpayer’s repayment exceeded $3,000. In this case,
Taxpayer may reduce her tax in the year of the repayment by the amount of tax paid
in the previous years that was attributable to the inclusion of the repaid amount. This
necessitates a recalculation of the tax for the prior years but does not require the filing
of an amended return. Instead the reduction in the tax is treated as a deduction. Any
excess should be claimed as a refund. However, if a smaller tax liability results from
simply deducting the repaid amount in the year of repayment, the taxpayer should
claim the deduction instead.
Regardless of whether the Taxpayer chooses to reduce her tax or claim a
deduction, the adjustment is made for the year of repayment. The returns for the prior
years in which the FERS payments were included are not reopened.
The amount of the repayment cannot be taken into account for any purpose
other than the computation.[86] Thus, prior years itemized deductions or net operating
losses are not affected. For example, the repayment generally cannot be used to
change a net operating loss. In determining whether tax for the year of repayment
should be computed (1) with a deduction for the tax year or (2) without such
deduction but taking into account the decrease in tax for prior years that results from
excluding the amounts from income, net losses for the tax year are preserved and net
operating losses and capital losses for prior years are also preserved.[87]
“A taxpayer may file an application for a tentative refund of any amount
treated as an overpayment of tax for the taxable year under I.R.C. §1341(b)(1)”,
provided that the application shall, “. . . be filed during the period beginning on the
date of filing the return for such taxable year and ending on the date 12 months from
the last day of such taxable year. . . .[88]
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Reg. § 1.1341(a)(2) explains the meaning of a claim of right as “an item
included in gross income because it appeared from all the facts available in the year of
inclusion that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such item”, and “restoration to
another” means a restoration resulting because it was established after the close of
such prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right
to such item. . .”
This section appears to give Taxpayer some relief in that she had to repay the
retirement pay. Thus, she can claim a deduction for the year in which she pays back
the disability retirement income to FERS.
12. NET OPERATING LOSS
The next issue is whether or not Taxpayer’s 2002 deduction can create a net
operating loss which can be carried back to some earlier years. Reg. § 1-13411(b)(1)(iii) states, “. . . if the deduction of the amount of the restoration results in a net
operating loss for the taxable year of restoration. . . [it] shall be carried back. . . as is
provided under section 172. . .” In order to determine the applicability of the law to
Taxpayer’s case it is necessary to see how (and where) the deduction is taken and then
to examine the rules of NOLs. The rules governing net operating losses (NOLs) are
found in I.R.C. § 172. A net operating loss is defined in § 172(c) as “an excess of the
deductions allowed by this chapter over gross income.”
The NOL provisions provide that a loss can only be carried back two years to
reduce the income of the year and perhaps create a refund for those years. However,
an NOL can be carried forward 20 years to reduce future taxes. The kicker in the
NOL provisions is that the allowable deductions in general pertain only to trade or
business activity and not personal deductions. I.R.C. § 172(d)(3) states, “No
deductions shall be allowed under I.R.C. §151 (relating to personal
exemptions)”. I.R.C. § 172(d)(4) explains that: “In the case of a taxpayer other than a
corporation, the deductions allowable by this chapter which is not attributable to a
taxpayer’s trade or business shall be allowed only to the extent of the amount of
income not derived from such trade or business.” Income from salary or personal
services, however, is income considered business income and can be offset by an
NOL.
In addition, any deduction for casualty or theft allowable under paragraph (2)
or (3) of I.R.C. § 165 (c) is treated as attributable to a trade or business.[89] It may
also be noted that an individual may also deduct an allowable “moving expense” in
computing an NOL.[90] In short, non-trade or business deductions can be netted
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against non-trade or business income but only to zero-out the latter, but no loss may
result. However, Reg. § 1.172-3 explains
(3) Nonbusiness deductions--(i) Ordinary deductions. Ordinary nonbusiness
deductions shall be taken into account without regard to the amount of business
deductions and shall be allowed in full to the extent, but not in excess, of that
amount which is the sum of the ordinary nonbusiness gross income and the
excess of nonbusiness capital gains over nonbusiness capital losses. See
paragraph (c) of this section. For purposes of section 172, nonbusiness
deductions and income are those deductions and that income which are not
attributable to, or derived from, a taxpayer's trade or business. Wages and
salary constitute income attributable to the taxpayer's trade or business
for such purposes.[91]
Taxpayer’s I.R.C. § 1341 claim of right deductions may create an NOL for
2002 but she may not have any income against which the NOL may be used.
13. FILING OPTIONS
After getting her check from OWCP (which includes the retroactive
adjustment, the reimbursement for medical expenses, and the pay-back to FERS)
Taxpayer may file amended returns (form 1040X) for the open years. The 1040X, of
course, requires documentation of the facts and a letter of explanation for the
amendment.
1.

Method of Applying for Tentative Refund under § 6411(d) Applying §

1341.
For tax years that are not still open, § 1341 provides alternative methods of
relief. In this case, Taxpayer may, simply, reduce the taxable income by the amount
of the repayment. In the alternative Taxpayer may reduce her tax in the year of the
repayment by the amount of tax paid in the previous years that was attributable to the
inclusion of the repaid amount. This necessitates a recalculation of the tax for the
prior years but does not require the filing of an amended return. Instead the reduction
in the tax is treated as a credit on the return for the current year. Any excess should be
claimed as a refund. However, if a smaller tax liability results from simply deducting
the repaid amount in the year of repayment, the taxpayer should claim the deduction
instead.
If the Taxpayer chooses not to file an amended return for the open years and,
in any event, wishes to apply for the Tentative Refund, (for the years no longer open)
the application is made by filing Form 1045 (the NOL Carryback form). The
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application must be made by filing those forms even if the taxpayer is not applying for
a tentative carryback adjustment under § 6411(a). Taxpayer must attach to the form a
separate schedule containing the information required under § 6411(d).
For the year 2002 Taxpayer’s return should either show a large miscellaneous
itemized deduction not subject to the 2% of AGI floor. (Schedule A, line 27) for her
claim of right reimbursed to FERS or should include form 1045 with the recalculation
of the previous taxes paid attributable to the repayment. The 2002 return will also
include tax-benefit income for medical expenses taken in 1993-1998 and 2002; for
which she was reimbursed.
The best option for Taxpayer is to file Form 1045. The instructions for Form
1045 state that, “Individuals may get a refund by filing Form 1040X, amended U.S.
Individual Income Tax Return, instead of Form 1045.” However, the same
instructions state that the purpose of Form 1045 is to allow individuals to apply for a
quick refund resulting from, “an overpayment of tax due to a claim of right
adjustment under Section 1341(b)(1).” Further, the instructions clarify that, “The IRS
is not required to process your Form 1040X within 90 days.” Thus, in order to get the
quick refund Taxpayer should file Form 1045. Moreover she “. . . must file Form
1045 within 1 year after the end of the year in which the . . . claim of right adjustment
arose.” The claim of right adjustment amount is to be entered on line 29 (year 2002
Form 1045) and is to be supported by the information required by the following
information:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
1341(b)(1).

Taxpayer’s name, address, and identification number;
The amount of income restored by the taxpayer to another (FERS);
The amount of the deduction taken under Section 1341(a)(2) on
Schedule A, Form 1040;
The tax for the year competed with the deduction taken;
The tax for each prior year determined before the Section 1344
adjustment and the decrease in tax that results; and
The amount treated as an overpayment of tax under Section

The regulations also muddy the water by stating, “An application for a
tentative refund under § 6411(d) is not a claim for credit or refund.” However, the
regulations go on to say, “. . . the filing of an application for tentative refund under §
6411(d) is not a claim for credit or refund in determining whether a claim for credit or
refund was timely filed. § 6411(d)(1) merely says, a taxpayer may file an application
for a tentative refund of any amount treated as an overpayment of tax for the taxable
year under §1341(b)(1)”. Thus, presumably, taxpayer could file amended returns for
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the open years or under § 6411 file a tentative refund under the claim of right doctrine
presumably for all years effected.
V. SUMMARY
The maze of finding the solution required that we journey through the 1986
IRS Code Sections relating to: granting the secretary the right to make refunds; time
limits for refund claims; claim of right doctrine; includable/excludable receipts for
personal injury and disability income; net operating losses; cash basis accounting;
exceptions to limitation for correcting prior years’ returns; tax benefit rule: and
recovery of prior year deductions.
Statutes of limitations are supposed to reduce the unfairness of defending
actions after a substantial period of time has elapsed and avoid the anxiety and
disruption caused by a prolonged fear of litigation. Unfortunately, in the area of
taxation, it is the substantive tax issues that determine which statute of limitations will
apply. In those situations, the statute cannot be determined until the underlying issues
have been resolved which ultimately determine which statute should have been
applied in the first place. Thus, the whole purpose of statutes of limitations has been
modified to be a statute that does not determine whether the law suit can be brought or
not, but must play another role once all the substantive issues have been resolved
which determine which statute should have been applied in the first place to bar the
action or reduce its remedies. In some instances, such as in the § 1341 claim of right
provision, the whole notion of a statute of limitations has been superseded by a
remedy that allows a taxpayer to go back an unlimited number of years and compute
the tax savings, but then requires this cumulative adjustment to be currently reported
on the tax return, thus, presumably not changing the statute of limitation but simply
circumventing it.
Our Taxpayer had an unusual, but not totally unique, situation which justified
her filing for refunds of previously paid taxes. Whereas the laymen’s sense of
fairness would suggest that she should be able to correct all prior years found to be in
error, the tax laws require a much more complex and confusing solution.
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